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Abstract—Adversarial attacks can affect the performance of
existing deep learning models. With the increased interest in
graph based machine learning techniques, there have been
investigations which suggest that these models are also vulnerable
to attacks. In particular, corruptions of the graph topology can
degrade the performance of graph based learning algorithms
severely. This is due to the fact that the prediction capability of
these algorithms relies mostly on the similarity structure imposed
by the graph connectivity. Therefore, detecting the location of the
corruption and correcting the induced errors becomes crucial.
There has been some recent work which tackles the detection
problem, however these methods do not address the effect of
the attack on the downstream learning task. In this work, we
propose an algorithm that uses node copying to mitigate the
degradation in classification that is caused by adversarial attacks.
The proposed methodology is applied only after the model for the
downstream task is trained and the added computation cost scales
well for large graphs. Experimental results show the effectiveness
of our approach for several real world datasets.
Index Terms— Adversarial attacks, Graph convolutional
networks, Semi-supervised learning
I. INTRODUCTION
The application of deep learning models in real world sys-
tems has become increasingly prevalent, and as a result there
has been an increased attention paid to their robustness and
vulnerability to adversarial attack [1]. It has been demonstrated
that many deep neural networks are susceptible to malicious
attack and this has given rise to serious concerns regarding
their reliability.
In many problem domains, including recommender sys-
tems, fraud detection, disease outcome and drug interaction
prediction, there are structural relationships between data
items. A graph is a natural mechanism for representing these
relationships and this has led to the desire to translate the
success of neural networks to the graph setting. An intense
research effort has led to many models and algorithms [2]–
[9]. It has been demonstrated that knowledge of the graph can
be leveraged to compensate for having limited access to la-
belled data. Subsequently, there has been successful industrial
application of these models [10]–[12]. This has raised concerns
regarding the vulnerabilities of graph neural networks (GNNs)
and researchers have commenced the development and inves-
tigation of attacks and defence mechanisms. Understanding
the adversarial vulnerabilities of GNNs helps to expose the
limitations of existing GNN models and can inspire better
models and training strategies [13], [14].
Convolutional neural networks are usually subject to attacks
that involve data manipulation to alter features. Graph neural
networks can be targeted by similar attacks, but they are
also subject to an alternative form of attack that involves
alteration of the graph topology. In [15], Zu¨gner et al. proposed
Nettack, a method for constructing adversarial perturbations
of graph data, which alters the graph topology and/or the
node attributes in order to produce significant degradation
in node classification performance. The experimental analysis
in [15] suggests that attacks on the graph topology can have
a more severe impact on classification performance compared
to feature alteration. The attack in [15] strives to disrupt the
classification of individual nodes in the graph; more recent
work has targeted the deterioration of performance across the
entire graph [16]. Other adversarial attacks on graphs have
been proposed that highlight the vulnerability of GNNs for a
wider range of inference tasks. In [17], Dai et al. show the
efficacy of their proposed method on a real-world financial
dataset where the classification task is to distinguish normal
transactions from abnormal ones. This practical scenario gives
a concrete example of how harmful such attacks can be and
motivates the need for designing efficient countermeasures.
In response to the development of attacks on graph learn-
ing, there has been some preliminary research into detecting
attacks. Zhang et al. [18] propose an algorithm to detect
which nodes have been subjected to an attack via modification
of their edges. The procedure relies on the inconsistencies
that the attack induces in the classification outputs in the
neighbourhood of an attacked node. Although the technique
in [18] offers a promising (albeit not foolproof) approach for
detection of an attack, it does not provide a mechanism for
rectifying the output of the learning algorithm.
In this paper, we focus on the next stage in the learning
pipeline. We address the question of what to do after a detec-
tion procedure has notified us that there is a high probability
that a node has been subjected to a topology attack. We
introduce a copying procedure to partially recover the model
accuracy of a graph convolutional neural network (GCN)
for the corrupted nodes. The procedure involves copying the
features of an attacked node to multiple similar locations in
the graph and evaluating the output at these locations. The
intuition is that when the features are moved to locations that
correspond to its true class and have not been attacked, the
GCN will return a correct classification. Through analysis of
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citation network datasets, we illustrate that this procedure can
improve the classification accuracy by 10-15 percent for the
attacked nodes.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present
background material, briefly reviewing graph convolutional
neural networks. Section III provides more detail regarding the
problem setting and Section IV presents our proposed recovery
methodology. Section V describes the numerical experiments
and presents and discusses the results. Section VI concludes
the paper and suggests future research directions.
II. GRAPH CONVOLUTIONAL NETWORKS
For the scope of this paper, we address a downstream node
classification task using a GCN proposed in [2], [19]. In this
setting, we are given a set of nodes V and edges E ⊆ V × V
that form a graph Gobs = (V, E). Node i is associated with a
feature vector xi and a label yi.
In the semi-supervised setting, we have knowledge of labels
only at a limited subset of nodes, Vtrain ⊂ V , and we aim to
predict the labels at the nodes at the test set, Vtest ⊂ V . The
model uses information provided by the observed graph Gobs,
the complete feature matrix X = [x1,x2, . . . ,xN ]T and the
labels in the training set YVtrain = {yi : i ∈ Vtrain}.
The layerwise propagation rule in simpler GCN architec-
tures [2], [19] is based on a graph convolution operation and
can be written as:
H(1) = σ(AˆGXW(0)) , (1)
H(l+1) = σ(AˆGH(l)W(l)) . (2)
Multiplication with the normalized adjacency operator AˆG
results in aggregation of the output features across node
neighborhood at each layer. W(l) is a matrix of trainable
weights at layer l of the neural network and σ denotes a
pointwise non-linear activation function. H(l) is the output
representation from layer l − 1. In a node classification
setting, using a L-layer network, the prediction is obtained
by applying a softmax activation in the last layer and is
written as Ŷ = H(L). The weights of the neural network are
learned via backpropagation with the objective of minimizing
the cross entropy loss between the training labels YVtrain and
the network predictions ŶVtrain = {yˆi : i ∈ Vtrain} at the
nodes in the training set.
III. PROBLEM SETTING
As stated in Section II, we address a semi-supervised node
classification task. Based on the graph Gobs, node features
X and a small subset of known training labels YVtrain ,
the goal is to infer the labels of the nodes in the test set,
Vtest = V \ Vtrain. However, a subset of the test nodes
Vattacked ⊂ Vtest are subjected to adversarial attack (details
in Section III-A), which modifies the graph. We consider
a random poisoning attack [15] scenario where the attack
precedes the model training. As a result, we only have access
to the attacked graph Gattacked. We assume that the attack
only targets a small number of nodes compared to the size of
the whole graph and it does not affect any nodes in Vtrain.
For the scope of this work, we also assume that the identities
of the nodes in Vattacked are known. In practice, this does
not impose any serious restriction on the applicability of the
proposed methodology since any reasonably accurate detection
algorithm, such as the one proposed in [18] can be employed to
identify the nodes in Vattacked. If a node is incorrectly labelled
as attacked, our proposed procedure in most cases does not
modify the classification output. Our goal is to correct the
possible classification errors for the nodes in Vattacked after
the poisoning attack has occurred.
A. DICE Attack
Since the impressive performance of most graph based
learning algorithms stems from the presence of edges between
similar nodes, we consider an attack which aims to disrupt
the similarity structure imposed by the graph connectivity.
The DICE (Delete Internally Connect Externally) attack is
a simple yet effective random attack. It is parameterized by
0 < β ≤ 1, which dictates the severity of the degradation
of the nodes in Vattacked. We assume that the attacker has
complete knowledge of the true labels of the nodes in Gobs.
For each attacked node v with degree dv , the attacker removes
dβdve of its existing edges at random and inserts new edges
between node v and dβdve other nodes, sampled uniformly
from the set of all nodes with different true labels from v. As
a result, node v has at most b(1− β)dvc neighbours with the
same label after the attack. Since this attack does not perturb
the degree of the target node, the degree distribution of the
nodes in Vattacked remains unaltered.
IV. METHODOLOGY
In our correction strategy, the classification of each node
in Vattacked is performed in the following way. First we
train a base GCN classifier using the small subset of labeled
nodes YVtrain on Gattacked and store the obtained model.
Then we compute a lower dimension representation of the
nodes of Gattacked using a node embedding algorithm. This
procedure summarizes the information provided by the graph
connectivity and the node features in the embedding. In
our experiments, we use the Graph Variational Auto-Encoder
(GVAE) [3] to obtain the embeddings but any other suitable
techniques can also be employed.
We form a symmetric, pairwise distance matrix D ∈
RN×N+ , whose (i, j)-th entry is defined as:
Di.j = ‖ei − ej‖2 . (3)
Here ei is the embedding of node i and Di,j is the distance
between node i and j. This distance matrix D is subsequently
used to select a set of similar nodes for each node in Vattacked.
For node v, we form the set V(p)v of the p most similar nodes
based on the p lowest distances from node v as follows:
V(p)v = {1 ≤ k ≤ N | k 6= v,Di,k = Di,(j), 1 < j ≤ p+ 1} ,
(4)
where Di,(j) is the j-th order statistic of {Di,k}Nk=1. Then
for each node k ∈ V(p)v , we copy the feature at node v to
node k (which is equivalent to copying the v-th row of X
to the k-th row) and compute the prediction yˆv→k at node k
using the existing GCN model. The prediction for node v using
the proposed copying procedure is obtained by computing the
average of {yˆv→k}k∈V(p)v . Figure 1 presents an overview of
the complete procedure.
v
v
j
vv
k
v
a)
b)
c)
d) + =
✓
✓
X
Fig. 1: Summary of the node copying procedure. a) In the
absence of the attack, the softmax of node v achieves the
correct classification in Gobs. b) Node v is targeted by an attack
and is now wrongly classified. c) The feature of node v is
copied to two new positions k and j and the softmax at those
positions yˆv→k and yˆv→j are obtained. d) The error on node
v is corrected by computing the average of yˆv→k and yˆv→j .
This correction procedure is successful if, on average, the
true class of node v is dominating in the set of softmax
outcomes. The intuition is that some of the similar nodes
included in V(p)v will have the same class as the true class
t of node v. We take the simplified view that, if uncorrupted,
a node will often have the same class as most of its neighbors.
If the node v is copied at node k in a “wrong” neighborhood,
meaning that node v has a different class w 6= t from node
k and its neighbors, then pulling the classification of node v
to the wrong class w is usually harder and the w-th entry in
the resulting softmax yˆv→k is likely to be smaller. However
when a node is placed in a “good” neighborhood, the weighted
average operation should reinforce the model confidence in
the correct class t. So when we perform the average over
softmax outputs at similar nodes, correct classification can be
recovered.
A naive implementation of this method requires p|Vattacked|
additional GCN evaluations after the training. This computa-
tional burden might be prohibitive for large graphs. However,
we note that the prediction at any particular node from an L
layer GCN is influenced only by the L-hop neighbourhood of
the node, which allows a much cheaper, localized computation
of {yˆv→k}. The procedure is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Error correction using node copying
1: Input: Gattacked, X, YVtrain , Vattacked
2: Output: ŶGCNattacked, Ŷ
Copying
attacked
3: Train a GCN using Gattacked,X, YVtrain and compute
ŶGCNattacked = {yˆv}v∈Vattacked .
4: Train a GVAE to obtain node embeddings, {ei}Ni=1. Com-
pute the pairwise distance matrix D using eq. (3).
5: for v ∈ Vattacked do
6: Form the set V(p)v using eq. (4)
7: for k ∈ V(p)v do
8: Copy the features of node v in place of node k and
compute yˆv→k using the existing GCN weights.
9: end for
10: Compute yˆCopyingv =
1
p
∑
k∈V(p)v yˆv→k
11: end for
12: Form ŶCopyingattacked = {yˆCopyingv }v∈Vattacked
V. EXPERIMENTS
We conduct experiments on three citation datasets: Pubmed,
Citeseer and Cora [20]. The prediction task is to classify the
topics of research articles. Each document is represented as
a node in a graph that is formed by adding an edge between
any two articles if one of them cites the other. The features
consist of a bag-of-words vectors extracted from the contents
of the articles. Statistics of the datasets can be seen in Table I.
The purpose of our attack correction algorithm is to retain
the advantages derived from the model’s ability to exploit
knowledge of the graph topology. The information from the
graph is more valuable when the amount of labelled data is
severely limited, so we focus on this setting.
For each trial, Vtrain is formed by randomly sampling 10 or
20 nodes per class. Then an additional 50 nodes are sampled
from the remaining set of nodes and these are targeted by the
attack. The rows in the adjacency matrix of Gobs of each node
in Vtrain are iteratively corrupted following the DICE attack
described previously. We consider the parameters β = 0.5
and β = 0.75 for the attack to test the robustness of the
recovery procedure. The number of new positions for a node
p is set to 10 in our experiment. This parameter can be
chosen more judiciously through cross-validation. The GCN
and GVAE hyperparameters are set to the values specified
in [3] and [19], respectively. These are obtained by optimizing
the classification accuracy on a validation set of 500 nodes on
the Cora dataset.
TABLE I: Datasets statistics
Dataset Nodes Classes Edges Features
Cora 2,708 7 4,732 3,703
Citeseer 3,327 6 5,429 1,433
Pubmed 19,717 3 44,338 500
For each setting, we conduct 50 random trials, each of which
corresponds to a random sampling of the training and attacked
nodes and a random initialization of the GCN and the GVAE
weights. We compare the accuracy on Vattacked before and
after copying. “Before copying” refers to the case where we
collect the prediction for the attacked nodes from the GCN,
which is trained on the attacked graph Gattacked. In addition,
we report a graph agnostic baseline “Neural Network” on the
Vattacked set to explore whether it is better to ignore the graph
altogether after an attack has been detected.
We employ a Wilcoxon signed-rank test to evaluate the
statistical significance of the results obtained. All such tests
are performed by comparing with the “Before copying” results.
Results marked with an asterisk (*) indicate settings where the
test failed to declare a significance at the 5% level.
A. Ablation Studies
We perform two ablation studies to validate the relevance
of the components of the proposed procedure.
1) Majority voting: To evaluate the utility of averaging the
softmax outputs, we compare with a method when classifica-
tion is obtained by majority voting. In this method, instead of
averaging the softmax outputs at the similar nodes, we make a
global decision according to a majority vote among the labels
obtained at each nodes. Ties are resolved by random selection.
2) No copying: The goal of the second ablation experiment
is to ensure that this method is not simply relying on the
clustering capability of the chosen embedding technique.
The procedure is the same up to the point where we copy
the node. Now, instead of copying the features of the attacked
node, we directly take the GCN output of the nodes in V(p)v and
repeat the two classification procedures: averaging softmax
and majority voting.
B. Results
TABLE II: Average accuracy of the attacked nodes : training
with 10 labels per class, β = 50%
Dataset Before Copying CopyingAverage Softmax Neural Network
Cora 51.2±8.0 56.2±6.2 48.9±7.2
Citeseer 42.2±7.7 50.3±7.6 39.4±10.0
Pubmed 51.7±6.7 63.3±6.0 65.8±6.6
TABLE III: Ablation study for majority voting : average
accuracy of the attacked nodes for Cora.
Labels
per class β
Before
Copying
Copying
Majority Voting
Copying
Average Softmax
10 50% 51.2±8.0 55.7±6.7 56.2±6.275% 38.8±6.4 38.3±8.4 39.3±8.0
20 50% 58.2±6.9 58.0±7.5* 59.1±7.5*75% 32.4±6.4 38.3±7.3 39.1±7.3
TABLE IV: Ablation study for majority voting : average
accuracy of the attacked nodes for Citeseer.
Labels
per class β
Before
Copying
Copying
Majority Voting
Copying
Average Softmax
10 50% 42.2±7.7 50.0±7.6 50.3±7.675% 29.0±6.9 40.4±6.1 40.2±5.9
20 50% 48.7±5.9 52.7±6.3 53.1±7.075% 31.1±7.0 43.8±7.2 44.2±6.3
TABLE V: Ablation study no copying : Average accuracy of
the attacked nodes for Cora
Labels
per class β
No Copying
Average Softmax
No Copying
Majority Voting
Copying
Average Softmax
10 50% 44.2±6.5 43.4±6.4 56.2±6.275% 21.2±6.3 21.2±5.8 39.3±8.0
20 50% 45.2±8.6 44.7±7.8 59.1±7.5*75% 20.1±5.1 20.2±5.2 39.1±7.3
TABLE VI: Ablation study no copying : Average accuracy of
the attacked nodes for Citeseer
Labels
per class β
No Copying
Average Softmax
No Copying
Majority Voting
Copying
Average Softmax
10 50% 35.6±6.4 35.6±6.4 50.3±7.675% 21.3±5.6 21.1±6.3 40.2±5.9
20 50% 36.8±5.5 37.7±5.4 53.1±7.075% 22.5±5.8 22.5±5.6 44.2±6.3
C. Discussion
From Tables II, III and IV, we observe that the proposed
algorithm offers significant improvement across all datasets
from the “Before Copying” baseline at the attacked nodes. In
Table II, the relative advantage is apparent as the method is
able to improve accuracy by between 5% and 11.6% while
outperforming the neural network in most cases. This illus-
trates the capability of the method of being able to leverage
the graph for classification in a situation where labeled data is
scarce and not sufficient to train a competitive graph agnostic
method.
The ablation studies also confirm that averaging over the
softmax performs better than majority voting for almost all
experimental settings, but the performance difference is small
(Tables III and IV). For the “No Copying” ablation experiment,
the results in Tables V and VI show that the proposed copying
mechanism offers significant improvement compared to simply
using the outputs at the similar nodes. In some cases, “No
Copying” is even worse than the performance of “Before
Copying”, for both softmax averaging and majority voting.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a recovery algorithm which
shows promising results in classifying nodes that have been
subjected to a targeted topology attack. The post-attack classi-
fication step adds negligible overhead to overall training pro-
cedure. We have conducted experiments and ablation studies
to highlight the relative importances of different components
of the methodology. This work can be further extended by
combining the method with an attack detection technique; this
will eliminate the assumption that we know the nodes that have
been attacked. This scenario is a more realistic setting that
we could expect to encounter in practice. In addition, another
important research direction is to examine how the depends on
the choice of embedding technique and graph-based classifier.
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